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Aristotle and Pedagogy
Aristotle’s metaphysics, ethics and psychology can help to
interpret pedagogy from a “scientific” point of view. Naturally, it
is not a question of considering the science of education as a
natural science born during modernity; the main difference is
that the object of pedagogy is actually a subject, i.e. the human
being, notably the free human. That is why an ancient thinker
like Aristotle can promote pedagogy through theoretical
reflection. In fact Aristotle clearly indicates human goals which
even nowadays can guide human education and action.
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Aristótoles y la pedagogía
La metafísica, la ética y la psicología de Aristóteles pueden
ayudar a interpretar la pedagogía desde un punto de vista
“científico”. Naturalmente, no nos referimos a la Ciencia de la
Educación en tanto que ciencia positiva nacida durante la
modernidad; la cuestión fundamental es que el objeto de la
Pedagogía es en realidad un sujeto, esto es, el ser humano, en
particular, el ser humano libre. Por eso, un pensador antiguo
como Aristóteles puede mejorar la Pedagogía con sus reflexiones
teóricas. De hecho, Aristóteles apunta a fines humanos que aún
hoy en día pueden guiar la educación y la acción humanas.
Palabras clave: pedagogía aristotélica, metafísica/filosofía de la
educación, conocimiento práctico, sabiduría.
THIS ARTICLE DOESN’T focus on Aristotle’s educational theory
(explained above all in Politics and Nicomachean Ethics) but deals with
the usability of his thought –theoretical and practical– in order to
found pedagogy. Aristotle’s approach is caring about the concrete
side of education; at the same time, however, Aristotle is interested
in a rational foundation of educational practice. From this point of
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view Aristotle’s thought is useful also in order to found pedagogy.
This article is only an initial attempt –inserted in a larger research
project– at considering the epistemological approach to pedagogy
inspired by Aristotle’s ontology. For this reason quoted sources are
exclusively drawn either from Aristotelian works or from the works
of other ancient authors, without references to critical literature. In
a word, this article hasn’t any claim of completeness, only
representing a first attempt at conceptual elaboration.
Initially Aristotelian reference can surprise because he is an
ancient thinker, commonly not considered as a “pedagogist” in the
strict sense, but rather as a philosopher and as a moralist. Yet, in the
last years, particularly inside the so-called “Rehabilitation of
practical philosophy” (a bright cultural movement spread above all
in Germany), Aristotle’s thought was approached from many people
finding it modern, because Aristotelian philosophy –at the same
time– is attentive to “good” (i.e. objective dimension of value) and
to “happiness” (i.e. subjective component of moral action).
For many reasons pedagogical reflection is close to practical
philosophy. In fact it concerns concrete reality, human actions,
personal freedom. That’s why this article takes back Aristotelian
reflection in order to find some theoretical orientations useful to
pedagogy.
1. Aristotle’s view of knowledge
In Metaphysics (VI, 1, 1025b 1-1026a 30) Aristotle recognises
three kinds of human knowledge:
1) theoretical sciences (mathematics, physics and metaphysics
whose purpose is to reach knowledge in itself);
2) practical sciences (whose purpose is to reach knowledge in
order to be active);
3) productive sciences (whose purpose is to reach knowledge in
order to produce something).
Aristotelian conception of knowledge is meaningful because
–beyond theory (theoría)– it gives value to practice (praxis) and –a
new attitude in ancient culture– to productive action (póiesis). In this
respect, Aristotle’s conception of human knowledge is remarkable,
including every action concerning human being. According to this
inspiration, Aristotle’s conception of being hasn’t only one
meaning. From this point of view, Aristotle’s ontology stands out
from Plato’s one because Plato –informed by Parmenides’ and
Pythagoras’ theories– brings back the variety of beings to unity. In
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his Metaphysics Aristotle says: “the term ‘being’ is used in various
senses, but with reference to one central idea and one definite
characteristic” (IV, 2, 1003a 30). Also Aristotle appreciates unity of
reality (showing coherence and harmony) but related to many
substances in mutual harmony.
Unlike Plato, Aristotle doesn’t put mathematics on the top of his
education system (introducing to dialectics) because he prefers to
observe the world and study natural phenomenons (zoology above
all). On the other hand, Plato wasn’t interested in natural studies,
while Aristotelian Lyceum practised it as later did the Alexandrian
Museum founded by Demetrius of Phalerum, Teofrasto’s disciple.
Aristotle likes concrete situations: for this reason he attentively
investigates human actions –not only the natural world–, naturally
studied also by Plato who was –however– less interested in
psychological analysis.
Compared with Plato’s, Aristotle’s mind is original. When
Aristotle considers ancient thinkers in the first book of his
Metaphysics, he recognises the incompleteness of pre-Socratics’
theories. Nevertheless, Aristotle considers their conclusions when he
interprets metaphysics like “knowledge of the primary causes” (I, 2,
983a 25). At the same time Aristotle goes back to Parmenides and
Plato, when he elaborates his ontology. Aristotle’s mind, however, is
original because he doesn’t put the “cause” (arché) inside a separated
reality (like Plato’s Theory of Ideas); on the contrary, the concrete
living world is recognised by Aristotle as the world of essence.
For this reason Aristotle recognises four kinds of causes (according
to the acknowledgement of many senses of the term/concept
“being”: see Metaphysics, V, 2, 1013b 5) connected with concrete
reality:
a) formal cause, i.e. the essence of beings (the soul for the living
ones);
b) material cause, i.e. the matter forming physical things;
c) efficient cause, i.e. the source of motion;
d) final cause, i.e. the goal every action aims to.
Also in this regard, unity is linked to multiplicity exactly as it
happens to categories. In fact, categories converge in the
acknowledgement of substance in each existing thing, but –at the
same time– they show the variety of beings partially similar and
partially different. The doctrine of act and potency shows the
dynamism of reality too. Which consequences on education?
Everyone is recognised as endowed with potentialities that could be
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put into practice according to favourable conditions. Aristotelian
doctrine confers dynamism to education, emphasising either the
educator’s role (who reveals potency) or the child’s one (who is
endowed with potentialities).
2. Aristotelian anthropology and pedagogy
Aristotle’s new approach emerges above all in his anthropology.
Exactly like Socrates, in Plato’s mind human identity coincides with
his soul: that’s why the top of the Platonic educational curriculum
is represented by mathematics; in fact mathematics, being abstract
knowledge, is considered related to spiritual world.
In his Physics (regarding sensible reality whose movement is
peculiar) Aristotle, speaking about soul, takes sides half-way between
pre-Socratics’ mind (who consider soul like a material principle
concerning the body) and Plato’s mind (who considers soul like a
spiritual essence separated from the body). Aristotle thinks of the
soul as the “form” of the body, i.e. tightly joined to it but without
having a material conformation. In fact Aristotle considers the
human being like “soul and body”.
The distance from Plato is clear and it rises from a famous page of
Aristotelian On the soul: “to say that the soul gets angry is as if one
were to say that the soul weaves or builds up a house. Probably it is
better not to say that the soul pities, or learns, or thinks, but to say
rather that the soul is the instrument whereby man does these
things” (I, 4, 408b 15). According to his unitary conception of
anthropology, Aristotle links rationality and emotions closely
resembling Modern mind. Another page from Nicomachean Ethics
confirms Aristotle’s original attitude: “hence choice may be called
either thought related to desire or desire related to thought; and
man, as an originator of action, is a union of desire and intellect”
(VI, 2, 1139b 5). Before Aristotle nobody emphasised the unity of
human being so strongly: nowadays this theoretical conception is
appreciable because it corresponds to Modern enjoyment of
subjectivity. Naturally Aristotle isn’t a contemporary thinker;
however he recognises the role played by sensitivity in human
personality. In fact, speaking about the human soul, Aristotle
maintains Platonic doctrine, recognising its nutritive side (linked to
vital functions), its sensitive side (linked to sensibility), its rational
side (peculiar to man). But Aristotle elaborates his doctrine as a
consequence not of ethics (as Plato does, according to his
conception of Ideal State divided into three classes), but of natural
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knowledge, being the living world composed of vegetables, animals
and humankind. From Aristotle’s point of view, the soul is
characterised by biological functions: nutritive soul by birth, feeding,
development; sensitive soul by perception, feeling, instinct;
intellective soul by knowledge, decision, responsibility.
3. Aristotelian mind and ancient medicine
When the freedom of pólis comes to the end, the political horizon
of Greek civilisation radically changes because of the weakness of the
community bonds. Aristotle bears witness to the new situation. In
fact he approaches human action from a new point of view,
emphasising the single person, the individual disposition and
personal responsibility: for example, Aristotle underlines virtuous
actions as done by individual (Nicomachean Ethics, I, 13, 1102a 5-
10). Naturally, the traditional mind is recognisable when Aristotle
says: “the good of the state is manifestly a greater and more perfect
good, both to attain and to preserve” (see Nicomachean Ethics, I, 2,
1094b 5-10), but –at the same time– he strongly focuses on the inner
genesis of human action.
In confirmation of this, the idea of dialectic changes from Plato to
Aristotle. According to Plato, dialectic thought represents the highest
knowledge because it is the most distant from empirical reality; on
the contrary, Aristotle thinks of dialectic as inference coming from
concrete reality and leading to it. Aristotle’s conception of concrete
knowledge is original because he considers practical rationality as
autonomous thinking related to a changing situation; on the
contrary, Plato is mainly interested in eternal truth related to the Idea
of Good. Obviously Pythagoras exerts an influence upon Platonic
ethics because unity prevails, not variety; moreover, this conception
was embraced by Speusippus (Plato’s successor at the head of the
Academy) and for this reason Aristotle left the school. 
Aristotle’s point of view is different. Aristotelian mind recognises
many sciences according to the many components of reality; and
each science is different from the others because of its different
exactness: “for it is a mark of an educated mind to expect that
amount of exactness which the nature of the particular subject
admits”; in fact “it is equally unreasonable to accept merely
probable conclusions from a mathematician and to demand strict
demonstration from an orator” (Nicomachean Ethics, I, 3, 1094b 25).
These Aristotelian words remind the Greek medical tradition because
also medicine is a practical science. Aristotle’s father used to be a
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physician; probably, it was him who introduced his son to medical
science, encouraging the observation of nature.
According to Hippocrates, ancient medicine was connected to a
precise and structured formative training, similar to Pythagorean
thíasos. Plato himself was interested in ancient medicine as Phaedrus
(270c) testifies, even if rational investigation is underlined:
“SOCRATES: ‘Now do you think one can acquire any appreciable
knowledge of the nature of the soul without knowing the nature of
the whole man?’. PHAEDRUS: ‘If Hippocrates the Asclepiad is to
be trusted, one cannot know the nature of the body, either, except
in that way’. SOCRATES: ‘He is right, my friend; however, we
ought not to be content with the authority of Hippocrates, but to
see also if our reason agrees with him on examination’.
PHAEDRUS: ‘I assent’”. He recognises medical knowledge endowed
with philosophical inspiration (regarding the human being as a
whole). For this reason Jaeger considers Greek ancient medicine as
paideía. First of all, it was conceived as a science looking for cause-
effect nexus in order to focus its specific object in a scientific way;
moreover, Greek medicine was interested in recognising concrete
and singular variables characterising a real situation.
From a pedagogical point of view, the second characteristic is very
important. Both Plato and Aristotle refer to Hippocrates considering
the question of practical truth, strongly connected to education.
Plato and Aristotle especially refer to ancient medicine when they
consider the judgement ability. In fact it isn’t inferred from abstract
principles (as it happens in mathematics) because it requires to
conform to the medical case, as Hippocrates says: “If the matter
were simple, as in these instances, and both sick and well were hurt
by too strong foods, benefited and nourished by weaker foods, there
would be no difficulty”. This state of uncertainty is due to a real
situation: “For it is necessary to aim at some measure. But no
measure, neither number nor weight, by reference to which
knowledge can be made exact, can be found except bodily feeling”.
In short: “wherefore it is laborious to make knowledge so exact that
only small mistakes are made here and there. And that physician
who makes only small mistakes would win my hearty praise.
Perfectly exact truth is but rarely to be seen” (Hippocrates, Ancient
medicine, 9). Hippocrates’ explanation culminates in the comparison
between physicians and pilots, whose skill appears when a
problematic event demands a concrete ability proper to the
circumstance. Pedagogical knowledge, just like medical knowledge,
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draws inspiration from interpersonal (as such, impersonal) rules but
it is always necessary to put it into practice according to the personal
profile of the child.
4. Ethics and reality in Aristotle
His nexus with ancient medicine leads Aristotle to consider not
only epistéme as necessary knowledge but also dóxa as baseless
knowledge. In fact, according to Aristotle, dialectic isn’t any more
the highest knowledge (indubitable science reducing the world to
unit), but rather a kind of knowledge corresponding to the variety of
the points of view, i.e. moving from common opinion and from
human conjecture (see Posterior Analytics, I, 30, 87b 19-20). This
important conception of Aristotelian ethics had been first elaborated
by Isocrates (see Antidosis, 271), confirming Aristotle’s originality
compared to Plato’s one. In fact Aristotle, teaching rhetoric at the
Academy, tried to conjugate Plato’s point of view (based on the
dialectical knowledge) with Isocrates’ thought (based on
argumentative knowledge). Moving from his theory of being,
Aristotle says: “the word ‘good’ is used in as many senses as the word
‘is’”; in short: “So clearly good cannot be a single and universal
general notion; if it were, it would not be predicable in all the
Categories, but only in one” (Nicomachean Ethics, I, 6, 1096a 23-29).
That’s why to this science corresponds a demonstrative ability
different from that of theoretical philosophy: in fact the moral
object isn’t eternal but changeable, not unitary but various. This
point of view is close to that of education, whose object is real and
dynamic; however, Isocrates and Aristotle reject scepticism because
they both recognise truth in practical situations, too.
This theoretical disposition is inspired from the medical tradition
focusing the topic of rule –it is the same for everyone– but also its
pertinence to each human person. From this point of view, the right
behaviour is to choose “the relative mean”; for example, “the equal
part is a mean between excess and deficiency” (Nicomachean Ethics, II,
5, 1106a 30). The acknowledgement of contingency leads Aristotle to
recognise the value of concrete conditions in education. In
Aristotle’s mind –side by side– there are objective values (according
to community culture) and subjective values (according to the
single’s behaviour). The medical tradition influences this disposition
because it moves from the concrete analysis of a situation according
to the physician’s clinical experience.
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5. Education and human action
Today, Hermeneutics is very significant from the cultural point of
view because it usually stresses the importance of contingency in
concrete situations. This attitude isn’t far away from the Aristotelian
idea of human action because Aristotle is interested in human
intention without yielding to scepticism. In this respect, the concept
of phrónesis (i.e. the ability to correctly calculate the more suitable
means to reach goals) is essential. It isn’t accidental that it drew
Gadamer’s attention, showing that Aristotle’s phrónesis overtakes
Plato’s mathematical paradigm. Gadamer emphasises that Aristotle
determines human good in opposition to the universal conception
of good by Plato, enclosing in the same idea individual good and
public good. According to Aristotle’s thought, human action is
oriented because the final cause leads human wish. Eudaimonía –i.e.
happiness– is the top of human desire. Aristotle underlines the
engagement between human reason and human desire, recognised
–the latter– as “the practical life of the rational part of man”, in
short: “the exercise of soul’s faculties and activities in association
with rational principle” (Nicomachean Ethics, I, 1098a 1-5, 15-20).
Unlike Plato, Aristotle doesn’t think that only one kind of virtue
exists: on the contrary, he recognises many virtues corresponding to
many aspects of reality. Aristotle distinguishes between “ethical
virtues” (concerning the animal side of human life) and “dianoetic
virtues” (regarding the intellectual dimension, peculiar to
humankind: diánoia means “reason”). This doctrine is very
important from the pedagogical point of view, because also
education concerns human behaviour. Ethical virtues connect
human life to the animal world, as they refer to the human
disposition to survive in a concrete situation. Anyway, the human
creature isn’t merely animal, because only to him/her is reason
applicable (“lógon dè mónon ánthropos ékei ton zóon”: see Politics, I, 2,
1253 a 10); that’s why ethical virtues are essentially connoted in
force of the control of soul on instinct: reason rules animal desire. 
Aristotle says that ethical virtues are linked to “the relative mean”
because they correspond to a balanced situation between excess and
deficiency; for example, courage is indicated like the middle
between cowardice and temerity. It’s interesting to realise how the
attitude in favour of balance is also present in Isocrates’ thought; in
his oration To Nicocles (31-33) he says: “let your own self-control
stand as an example to the rest, realising that the manners of the
whole state are copied from its rulers”. Someone achieves virtues by
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leading practical habits: in fact –Aristotle says– “whereas we acquire
the excellences through having first engaged in the activities, as is
also the case with the various sorts of expert knowledge –for the way
we learn the things we should do, knowing how to do them, is by
doing them” (Nicomachean Ethics, II, 1, 1103 a 33). To tell the truth,
ethical virtues aren’t the most important to human beings as it shows
their explanation –concerning to their achievement– of practical (not
theoretical) activities: “for instance, people become builders by
building houses, harpers by playing on the harp; similarly –Aristotle
says– we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing
temperate acts, and brave by doing brave acts” (Nicomachean Ethics,
II, 1, 1103 a 33-1103 b 2). Nevertheless, from the pedagogical point
of view it is appreciable the consideration of emotions not like an
antagonist factor of reason. In fact Aristotle puts human desire
(órexis) and human reason side by side as regards the source of
human action: in fact, “both of these […], mind and appetite, are
productive of movement in space” (On the soul, III, 10, 433a 10-433b
10). The most significant virtues are dianoetic virtues, because they
directly regard the intellective soul –logós– which is peculiar to
human beings. Aristotle is coherent with his appreciation of
contingent reality, and –consequently– he doesn’t recognise only
theoretical reason (the source of human learning) but also practical
reason (the source of human action) even if he grants a higher
dignity to the theoretical reason compared to the practical one. With
theoretical reason Aristotle associates the virtue of intellectual
accomplishment (sophía), with practical reason the virtue of wisdom
(phrónesis).
From the pedagogical point of view it is very important to
recognise a practical kind of rationality, because in order to educate
someone it is necessary to improve his/her capacity to behave.
Aristotle considers practical reason as an expression of human
reason, not only related to something to do. To his mind, education
isn’t only téchne (i.e. operating activity) but also knowledge. After
acknowledging phrónesis as a virtue of rational soul, practical
knowledge achieves the same dignity of theoretical knowledge,
because praxis is recognised as essentially belonging to human
beings; at the same time, practical knowledge is illuminated by logós:
it is an important step in order to integrally recognise human nature.
Why does Aristotle understand this? Because of his rhetorical
studies.
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6. Rhetoric, poetics and education
Rhetorical studies helped Aristotle to extend his theoretical
horizons. In the beginning of the Aristotelian “Art” of rhetoric  it is
written: “Rhetoric is a counterpart of dialectic; for both have to do
with matters that are in a manner within the cognizance of all men
and not confined to any special science” (I, 1, 1354 a 1). Obviously
Aristotle is inspired by Isocrates who recognised human word
peculiar to human beings (see Panegyricus, 47-48). That’s also the
Aristotelian opinion. In fact Aristotle observes that the human being
is not only able to emit sounds but also to articulate meaningful
expressions. In fact, the animal voice indicates painful and joyful
experiences just as it happens with the human beings. On the
contrary, only the human creatures are able to express good and evil
by using words (see Politics, I, 2, 1253 a 10-20). Aristotle confirms
this idea by observing oral organs which are for the human word. In
fact, physical configuration of lips just like tongue and teeth are
disposed in order to favour word pronunciation (see Parts of animals,
II, 16, 659b 35-III, 1, 661b 15).
As to rhetoric, Aristotle particularly underlines the rational side of
rhetorical communication and criticises its reductive conception as
exclusive (or prevailing) motion of human passions (see The ‘Art’ of
rhetoric, I, 1, 1354a 15-1354b 10). On the contrary, from the
Aristotelian point of view, rhetoric is similar to dialectic, even if –on
one side– the object of rhetorical communication is only changing
situation, –on the other– the object of dialectic communication is
larger, including the truth.
Aristotle, by focusing his own attention on rhetorical
communication, contributes to expand the conception of human
knowledge. In fact, to his mind, knowledge regards not only epistéme
(i.e. theoretical thinking) but also dóxa. Theoretical sciences
(metaphysics, theology, physics and mathematics) reach knowledge
as such; practical sciences tend to perfect the agent; productive
sciences tend to make something. Anyway Aristotle considers that
human thought is also interested in contingency: this is very
important to pedagogy.
Something similar happens about poetry (the art of producing
tales: see Poetics, 1, 1447a 1-15). Also poetry is téchne but not in the
negative sense emphasised by Plato, who considered it an obstacle
to truth. To Aristotle’s mind, poetry is a way to know reality like
dialectic: they both are involved in changing situations. Changing
reality is the object of pedagogy too. Just like poetry (see Poetics, 9,
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1451a 36-b11), also education starts from probable situations; just
like rhetorical knowledge, pedagogy regards uncertain situations so
that it is possible to refer to it what Aristotle says in the “Art” of
rhetoric: “it is evident that the materials from which enthymemes are
derived will be sometimes necessary, but for the most part only
generally true” (I, 2, 1357a 35).
7. Aristotle, complexity and pedagogy
Today it is obvious to recognise complexity as a peculiarity of
Post-modern age. Many meanings are commonly associated with
complexity, especially –from the educational point of view– the
extension of knowledge and its corresponding specialisation. This is
a difference from Modernity where –particularly as a result of the
scientific revolution– the mathematical-experimental cognitive
paradigm prevailed on any other. Something like this also happened
to pedagogy, because the natural observation led to recognise
methods by interpreting spiritual knowledge like a physical science
(for example during Positivism).
Actually, natural observation and natural sciences are useful to
pedagogy because education is involved in concrete reality. But it is
important to recognise the originality of the spiritual dimension in
human beings. From this point of view, pedagogy is closer to
philosophy or theology than to physics or natural sciences. That’s
why it isn’t completely correct to say that pedagogy was born in
Modernity: in regard to natural observation, it’s correct; but in
regard to the knowledge of human goals, pedagogical sciences are
rooted in ancient philosophy and theology. In fact, the Classical
civilisation acknowledged the metaphysical aspect of the human
being and so did Medieval thought.
In short, it’s obvious that –from the descriptive point of view–
pedagogy rised during Modernity but –at the same time– it’s
necessary to affirm that –from the point of view of ethical guidelines–
pedagogy was born in the Classical and Medieval age. Still today the
Aristotelian metaphysics –because of its confirmation of the
phenomenal world (the “second cause” according to Thomas
Aquinas)– contributes to the delineation of pedagogy as an integral
human science, related –at the same time– to the concrete situation
and to the theoretical foundation. Many characteristics of the
Aristotelian thought can positively be reconsidered; for example, his
ontology considering both the unity and the variety of reality.
Unlike Plato, Aristotle doesn’t reduce multiplicity to unity because
he thinks unity and variety coexist. Many appreciable consequences
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come out of this conception. First of all, Aristotle increases the value
of phenomenal reality and concrete situation whose variety he leads
back to the variety of being: in fact the concept/term “being” is “used
in various senses”. From the epistemological point of view, this
attitude helps interpret complexity: in fact, many sciences
correspond to the variety of reality. Especially from the pedagogical
standpoint, Aristotle’s mind is appreciable, because it justifies one
fundamental science (pedagogy) connected to many specific sciences
(sciences of education). It is important to emphasise that this
formulation allows to conform to the most recent epistemological
paradigm without renouncing to consider pedagogy as the basic
science securing unity to education. In fact, the paradigm of
“sciences of education” exposes pedagogy to the risk of
fragmentation. From this point of view, Aristotle’s ontology helps
recognise that pedagogy is a rational science, even if it differs from
the kind of rationality peculiar to natural sciences. Pedagogy is a
practical science: the Aristotelian metaphysics leads to appreciate
the complexity of human action; the Aristotelian ethics and
psychology lead to appreciate the complexity of voluntary decision
and human conscience without yielding to irrationality. Aristotle
analyses passions, classifies virtues, appreciates emotions but always
aiming at human responsibility, because –as he says– the human
being is the “rational animal”. What does it mean? To ancient Greek
“rationality” is lógos and this word means at the same time:
a) the world is under an eternal law giving harmony to everything;
b) the human being is the only living creature able to recognise
the eternal law by his thought;
c) the human word is able to express the thought knowing eternal
law.
Only the human being is the “rational animal”, because the
universal order (universal lógos) is clear to his/her lógos. Nowadays,
Aristotle’s theoretical conception allows Post-modern criticism on
Modern rationality not to be directed to rationality itself. From the
pedagogical point of view, it also means appreciating emotions and
feelings without forgetting that to the human being as the “rational
animal” is peculiar –classically speaking– not the instrumental
rationality but the argumentative rationality, careful to the
dimension of sense, meaning and value.
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